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I.

INTRODUCTION

Aesop was an optimist. In his cautionary fable that inspired the
famous admonition about a wolf in sheep’s clothing, the predator wolf
intentionally dons a sheep’s fleece in order to sneak up on a lamb. The
wolf’s disguise, it turns out, is so effective that he ends up being mistaken
for a real sheep and being killed by another wolf. According to Aesop,
even the most effective fraud can turn against its perpetrator, and justice
can be served. 1 The results are not always so salutary with other
clandestine predators, including legal rules that appear aimed at protecting
vulnerable groups, but instead provide valuable tools to be exploited by
predators. The thesis of this Article is that some of the takeover regulations
that have proven so successful at protecting minority shareholders in the
United Kingdom (U.K.) and have been incorporated into European
takeover regulation, may operate in Continental systems as a deceptive
guise that ensures protection for entrenched controlling shareholders.
In a recent and insightful work, John Armour and David Skeel address
the reasons why takeovers in the U.K. and in the United States of America
(U.S.) are regulated so differently. More specifically, their work
demonstrates how historical events and the economic, legal, and political
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1. In the Gospel, Matthew also warns, “Beware of false prophets, which come to you
in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.” Matthew 7:15 (King James).
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climate—particularly the role of lobbying groups—in the U.S. and the U.K.
have affected both the content of substantive takeover rules, and the
processes through which they are created and enforced. 2
As these works describe, in the U.K., acquisition of a set threshold of
the voting shares (thirty percent) requires the buyer to launch a mandatory
tender offer on all the outstanding shares at the highest price paid for those
shares. No laws or regulations of this sort are provided under U.S. law at
the federal level, even if some states provide for “best-price rules” whose
effects are similar to the U.K. mandatory bid rule. 3 Similarly, the British
“City Code” imposes a ban on directors’ actions that might frustrate a
hostile bid without shareholder approval, which contrasts starkly with the
relative freedom that U.S. directors have to resist a hostile acquisition. 4
Armour and Skeel explain these differences by pointing to the fact
that, notwithstanding the widespread ownership structure that both systems
have in common, the role of institutional investors in the U.K. as
shareholders and as an organized group influencing the policy makers, is
absent in the U.S. Instead, in the U.S., direct investment by small and
disorganized shareholders is more common. Armour and Skeel also
examine why corporate directors and managers, in the context of American
federalism, have a more effective role than their British counterparts in
shaping takeover rules.
The most original part of their contribution underlines the importance
of the rule-making process in determining the substantive regulatory
outcome. In this respect, Armour and Skeel juxtapose British “coerced
self-regulation, made under a clear governmental threat of intervention” 5
favored also by the geographical proximity of the major actors in the City,
with the U.S. legislative and case-law processes, which are largely derived

2. John Armour & David Skeel, Jr, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why ?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727
(2007); see also Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover
Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171,
184 (2006) (discussing the differences with further bibliographical references).
3. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations PostMITE: The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REV. 731, 748 (1987).
4. See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrel, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 140 (2001). The only constraints on U.S.
directors are those flexible limits set by fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule.
The adoption of a neutrality rule inspired by the British approach, even if just as an opt-in
provision, is advocated by some American scholars as a way to increase investors’
protection. See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrel, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 140 (2001). Contra Jonathan R. Macey,
Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds do a Better Job Than the States in Regulating
Takeovers? 57 BUS. LAW. 1025 (2002) (opposing Bebchuck’s and Ferrel’s proposition).
5. Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1764.
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from litigation and judge-made rules. 6 Combining these and other
elements, they conclude that, in the U.K., coordinated and influential
institutional investors were able to promote a private takeover regime
particularly favorable to minority investors. The pillars of this regime are
the mandatory bid and the non-frustration rule. In the U.S., by contrast,
incumbent directors and managers were able to obtain more leeway to
resist takeovers thanks to a number of factors ranging from U.S. federalism
that (borrowing the image used by Armour and Skeel) amplifies the voice
of corporate managers to the lesser impact of institutional investors’
lobbying efforts on the development of case-law.
The story told by Armour and Skeel is not only well grounded and
convincing from an historical perspective, it is also consistent with modern
public-choice models that analyze the role of lobbying groups in
determining the level of investors’ protection in different jurisdictions, such
as the one recently proposed by Bebchuk and Neeman. 7
But, therein lies the rub. If it is true that the U.K. approach to
takeovers favors institutional investors in systems with a significant degree
of dispersed ownership structure, why would the essential pillars of this
approach be spontaneously adopted, well before the Thirteenth Directive,
in several continental European countries that have concentrated ownership
structures? In these systems, entrenched controlling shareholders and the
associations representing their interests are among the most influential
pressure groups in the political arena, and institutional investors play a
comparatively less relevant role. In this context, Armour and Skeel’s
analysis leads to additional questions: Who are the lobbying groups that
promoted this legislation? Or, is it possible that the legislatures were
merely particularly attentive to the need of protection of minority
investors? Why were countries such as France and Italy among the first,
dating back to the 1990s, to embrace the British regime when they have
otherwise been slower in legislative protection of minority investors?
The answers to these questions are both consistent with and contrary
to Armour and Skeel’s analysis. They are apparently contrary to their more
specific thesis that the presence or absence of effective lobbying by
institutional investors is in large part what accounts for (or at least what
accounted for as between the U.S. and the U.K.) whether minority-friendly
takeover reforms were adopted. A direct application of their analysis
would predict that in Continental systems that lack such active institutional
investors, the pillars of U.K. takeover regulation would not be adopted.
Instead, the opposite is true. These “minority-friendly” rules were adopted
6. Id. at 1776.
7. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group
Politics (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 603,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030355.
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in Continental systems, even before such rules were imposed by the
European Union. Still, the story in Continental Europe is consistent with
Armour and Skeel’s larger narrative about the role of the relevant actors in
effectuating substantive legal changes. As will be demonstrated, with some
small but meaningful adjustments, instead of protecting minorities, these
takeover rules in systems with widespread ownership structures might
serve the interests of the most important economic actors and pressure
groups in those countries—strong block-holders.
The larger moral of this tale, therefore, brings a new twist to the
existing debate over legal transplants. That debate considers how well a
transplanted legal institution may be adapted to function as intended in its
new environment, with the underlying reasoning being that a naïve
legislature attempted to import a rule without fully considering how the
rule would function in the different legal, social and political framework. 8
This article instead considers the more cynical possibility of whether, in the
rush toward European harmonization, notions of good corporate
governance can be manipulated to turn rules against their own purposes. 9
In Aesop’s fable, the effectiveness of the contrivance was limited
because of the fortuitous intervention of another predator. Corporate
raiders cannot, however, dismantle the effects of anti-takeover rules in
disguise.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, I offer a brief outlook on the
ownership structures prevailing in continental Europe and, more precisely,
in some countries used as benchmarks for the discussion. Part III will

8. Beyond events in Europe, this issue is directly relevant to the U.S. debate on
takeovers. Several U.S. scholars have argued in favor of the adoption of rules inspired by
the British experience, such as the non-frustration action rule. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L.
REV. 111, 140 (2001) (discussing the benefits of choice-enhancing federal intervention in
takeover law); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory
Competition, 57 BUS. LAW. 1047 (2002) (responding to critiques of their previously cited
article). But see Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job
Than the States in Regulating Takeovers? 57 BUS. LAW. 1025 (2002) (criticizing the
position of Bebchuk and Ferrell as well as their analysis and characterization of Delaware
law); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate
Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961 (2001) (praising the choice-enhancing aspects of Bebchuck and
Ferrell’s position while critiquing the weaknesses of their position); Roberta Romano, The
Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
387, 507 n. 307 (2001) (stating that there is no data indicating that the rule preferred by
Bebchuk and Ferrell has made U.K. firms more valuable than Delaware firms); Robert
Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1157-64 (2002) (criticizing the political assumptions
behind Bebchuk and Ferrell’s position).
9. See Bebchuk & Neeman, supra note 7, at 30 (predicting that “[i]nvestor protection
will be lower when public officials setting the level of investor protection assign a relative
high weight to contributions from interest groups in their objective function”).
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provide some evidence concerning the adoption of mandatory bids, board
neutrality, and the breakthrough rule in Europe before the Thirteenth
Directive, and its effect on takeover dynamics. Part IV takes a closer look
at the how some countries have implemented that directive. The thesis
there is that the Directive represented an occasion to tune the U.K.
approach even more to the defensive needs of entrenched controlling
shareholders. Part V will discuss a case study—specifically, the adoption
of the Thirteenth Directive in Italy. Italy represents an excellent test for the
thesis advanced in this work because, particularly if compared with the
U.K., its listed corporations have a very concentrated ownership structure
and institutional investors are relatively weak and strongly related to
banking institutions which might be less concerned with investors’
protection. Nonetheless, Italy complied with the British approach well
before the enactment of the Thirteenth Directive. Part VI will consider,
with some empirical evidence, the effects on the Italian market for
corporate control of the adoption of these rules.
II.

SAME RULES, DIFFERENT EFFECTS: OWNERSHIP PATTERNS IN THE
U.K AND IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

Mandatory bid, the best price rule, board neutrality, and breakthrough
provisions, which represent the entire panoply of what is considered to be
effective takeover regulation, might have very different effects when
applied in systems with concentrated ownership instead of dispersed
ownership. This hypothesis has been largely overlooked, especially in the
public debate, notwithstanding the fact that it is quite intuitive. 10
Consider mandatory bids. In very broad terms, this rule provides that
when a bidder acquires a set threshold of voting shares of a listed
corporation (let’s say 30 percent), it must launch an offer on all the
outstanding shares at an equitable price. Now imagine how this rule would
apply in a system with a very dispersed ownership structure in which, for
example, the average participation necessary to have de facto control of a
corporation is ten percent. In that context, a raider can easily succeed in a
hostile acquisition without triggering the mandatory bid. If the current
10. One important work that has promoted this thesis is by Goergen, Martynova and
Renneboog, in which they argue that similar regulatory changes in corporate governance
might have different, sometimes opposite effects in different countries. More specifically,
the implementation of the Thirteenth Directive on takeovers, whose basic features are
largely consistent with U.K. takeovers regulation, might lead to either more dispersed or
more concentrated ownership, depending on the initial state of the system in which it is
introduced. See Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate
Governance Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms, (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 33/2005, April 22, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=709023.
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controlling shareholder holds ten percent of the voting shares, it might be
sufficient to acquire, for example, eighteen percent to be in the driver’s
seat. And this can be done with a partial tender offer, by buying shares on
the market, or by negotiating blocks of shares outside the market with
qualified minority shareholders. In any case, by not exceeding the thirty
percent threshold, no mandatory bid is required on all the shares.
The important implication is that, in a system with widespread
ownership, the real goal of the mandatory bid is not so much the one of
protecting minority investors from any change in control, but rather from a
change in control when the resulting ownership structure of the corporation
is characterized by the presence of a large block-holder. The importance of
this protection is that a new large block-holder weakens the potential
disciplining role of the market. In other words, mandatory bids provide a
fair exit to shareholders when a change of control takes place that is not
easy to reverse.
Compare the same rule in a system in which the ownership structure is
concentrated, and the largest shareholders typically hold a percentage
higher than the threshold triggering the mandatory bid. In that context, the
practical effect of the rule is that whoever aims at obtaining control must be
ready to buy all the outstanding shares. Needless to say, rendering the
acquisition more expensive might help the controlling shareholder to fend
off an undesired suitor. 11
11. See Rolf Skog, Does Sweden Need a Mandatory Bid Rule? A Critical Analysis
(Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 1997), available at
http://www.suerf.org/download/studies/study2.pdf; see also Beate Sjåfjell, The Golden
Mean or a Dead End? The Takeover Directive in a Shareholder versus Stakeholder
Perspective, 22 (Sept. 23, 2005) (unpublished paper presented at Centre for European
Company Law September 23, 2005 conference) (on file with The University of
Pennsylvania
Journal
of
Business
Law),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=866184. Sjåfjell observed that, with
respect to some Nordic countries:
[A]n interesting possible explanatory contribution lies in the lobbyism
of persons in control in companies (powerful managers or directors, or
controlling shareholders) against national legislators for a mandatory bid
rule, to make competing acquisitions of control more expensive and
thereby less likely to happen. This may be part of the explanation for
the introduction of the mandatory bid rule in Sweden, after strong
opposition from leading academics in the field. It could also be an
explanation for Finnish companies such as Nokia in their articles of
association voluntarily adopting a lower threshold than the high
legislative one.
See also Luca Enriques, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Proposed EC Takeover Directive:
Harmonization as Rent-Seeking? in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE
(Guido Ferrarini et al. ed., 2004) (including corporate managers and block-holders as
“interest groups” that might gain from a mandatory bid rule, since the rule makes hostile
bids more expensive). But see Erik Berglöf & Mike Burkart, European Takeover
Regulation, 18 ECON. POL’Y 171, 196 (2003) (explaining that a mandatory bid rule creates an
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In a similar vein, the board neutrality rule can also lead to dramatically
different consequences depending on the ownership structure of the
corporation. This rule provides that when a tender offer is launched, the
directors of the target corporation cannot initiate or continue any action that
might frustrate the success of the offer without obtaining the approval of
the shareholders’ meeting. Once again, when the ownership structure is
widespread, and the real agency problem is between directors and
managers as against relatively dispersed shareholders, required approval by
shareholders’ meeting empowers the investors. This is especially true if—
as Armour and Skeel show to be the case in the U.K.—organized and
competent institutional investors, able to make informed decisions, are
present and actively participate in the shareholders’ meeting.
Conversely, when the ownership structure is concentrated and there
are strong controlling shareholders, the real agency problem is not between
directors and managers, on the one hand, and dispersed equity investors, on
the other, but rather between majority and minority shareholders. A
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting in that context does not really
address the crucial issue. More simply, when there is a controlling
shareholder holding more than forty percent of the voting shares, a
defensive measure against a hostile bid voted by the shareholders’ meeting
is unlikely to resolve the inherent conflict of interest between incumbent,
entrenched controllers able to extract private benefits from the corporation
and minority investors that might welcome a value-maximizing bid.
While these themes with specific references to selected European legal
systems will be explored in more detail below, this sketch gives some form
to the basic intuition that the same takeover rules might have different or
even opposite effects in different markets. Against this backdrop, it is also
helpful to have a brief refresher on the most common ownership structures
in five major European countries. Figure 1 represents the average
shareholding of the largest shareholder in France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
and the U.K.

environment where the rival will only take control of the company if small shareholders are
also paid a premium).
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Figure 1 - Average largest shareholder (%)
51,98
46,13

48,14
37,91

18,26
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Germany
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Spain

U.K.
Source: Van der Elst (2004)

As this chart illustrates, and as is well-known, the U.K. presents a
clearly unique ownership structure in Europe. The difference and its
potential effects are even more striking if we consider, as will be discussed
later, that in most European systems, and in particular those considered in
Figure 1, the threshold triggering the mandatory bid is set at around thirty
percent (33.3 percent in France). What might be less intuitively obvious,
but is critically important, is that as a general proposition only British
corporations can be taken over without a compulsory tender offer on all the
shares. In contrast, to acquire control over a continental European
corporation, either through a friendly or a hostile mechanism, the buyer
must be ready to buy all the shares.
This conclusion is confirmed, and even more evident, if we consider
the percentage of listed corporations that, in every country, is controlled
with a participation that is greater or lesser than thirty percent, as illustrated
in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 - Ownership concentration
% corporations < 30%

% corporations > 30%
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Source: Van der Elst (2004)

As the chart clarifies, corporations controlled with less than thirty
percent of the voting capital are the vast majority in the U.K., while the
opposite is true in continental Europe.
Turning now to the qualitative composition of the shareholders, we
can assess the role played by institutional investors. In the U.K.,
institutional investors such as mutual and pension funds are a significant
force; in the other countries considered, however, either families or other
private corporations make up the lion’s share.
Table A - Ownership by Investor Type (source: FESE 2007)
NonFinancial
Individual Public
financial
Foreign
Enterprises
Investors
Sector
Enterprises
France
6%
11%
39%
29%
15%
Germany

15%

7%

21%

15%

42%

Italy

26%

10%

13%

23%

28%

Spain

23%

3%

33%

17%

24%

U.K.

14%

1%

33%

50%

2%

As Table A illustrates, financial enterprises, including collective
investment vehicles, represent across the Channel approximately fifty
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percent of the shareholders of listed corporations.
A similar picture is provided by the following data in Table B, which
enumerates the largest and second largest shareholders among the most
relevant listed corporations:

France

Table B—Largest Shareholders Top 100 Corporations
(source: Kirchmaier, Grant 2006)
Second Largest
Largest Shareholder
Shareholder
family (37)
institutional (24)

Germany

family (36)

institutional (42)

Italy

family (30)

institutional (31)

Spain

corporate (27)

institutional (31)

U.K.

institutional (81)

institutional (86)

The same phenomenon can also be identified with respect to the
allocation of assets managed by institutional investors. For instance, in
Italy and France in 2004, equity funds accounted for approximately twenty
percent of the total number of investment funds. The percentage was
higher in Spain (slightly above thirty percent) and in Germany
(approximately forty percent). These numbers were significantly and
consistently lower than in the U.K., where assets allocated to equity funds
amounted to seventy percent of the total assets collectively invested. 12
Ownership structures in the United Kingdom differ both in terms of
concentration and with regard to the role played by institutional investors. 13
Obviously, these are not the only elements that might explain the ability of
institutional investors to influence the policy makers and obtain a certain
degree of investor protection. Many other variables might interfere. If,
however, we assume that the pillars of the British approach are particularly
favorable to minority investors in systems with widespread ownership
structures, as Armour and Skeel conclude, then it should be puzzling how
that approach emerged spontaneously in jurisdictions characterized by
concentrated ownership in which institutional investors are much less
present. Before turning to that specific question, it is worth briefly
considering whether and how that approach emerged in those systems.

12. ASSOGESTIONI, GUIDA ITALIANA AL RISPARMIO GESTITO—2005 FACTBOOK, 90,
available at www.assogestioni.it.
13. Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European
Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002) (analyzing ownership and control trends of
corporations in Western European countries).
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III. THE ADOPTION OF THE U.K. APPROACH TO TAKEOVERS IN SOME
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PRIOR TO THE XIII DIRECTIVE
As noted, several continental European systems adopted some form of
the British approach before this was required by the European Union. This
part describes those national developments, putting them in an economic,
historical, and political context.
The U.K. led the way to the mandatory bid. This measure was not
immediately introduced with the Takeover Code of 1968, but in 1972 in
response to a defensive acquisition of shares by the shareholders of a
corporation targeted by two rival bids. In reaction to this event, the
Takeover Panel, the self-regulatory body administering takeover rules,
required that any bidder purchasing forty percent or more of a corporation’s
shares should launch a tender offer on all the outstanding shares. In 1974
the threshold was lowered to the current level of thirty percent. 14
France followed suit in 1989. Law 89-531 established a mandatory
tender offer on all the outstanding shares, as well as other securities or
rights that might convert or attribute a voting equity stake, triggered by the
acquisition of one-third of the voting shares. 15 Until recently, French law
did not provide a best-price rule equivalent to the one contained in the
Takeover Code. The French authority responsible for the promulgation and
enforcement of takeover rules, the French Conseil des Marchés Fiancieres
(which replaced the Conseil des Bourses des Valeurs), used to require “that
the compulsory offer price be at least as high as the highest target share
price during the period over which the share acquisitions giving rise to the
compulsory offer requirement were made.” 16
Austria is also an interesting example. The Wien Börse AG, founded
in 1771 under Empress Maria Theresa, is one of the oldest European stock
exchanges but one of the smallest in terms of capitalization. 17 The
corporations listed on this market generally have a concentrated ownership
structure, and the share of collective investors is around 14.5 percent of the

14. Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1764.
15. David J. Berger, A Comparative Analysis of Takeover Regulation in the European
Community, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 66 (1992).
16. Charles M. Nathan, Michael R. Fischer & Samrat Ganguly, An Overview of
Takeover Regimes in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, 1400 PLI/CORP 943, 978
(2003).
17. With a capitalization of approximately 121,800 million euro in August 2006, the
Austrian stock exchange is slightly smaller than the Greek and Denmark ones, and
represents approximately one-fifth of the London Stock Exchange. See Commission Staff,
Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids; Commission of the
European Communities, Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids,
available at www.europa.eu.
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equity capital, significantly below that of the U.K. 18 Since the 1999
Übernahmegesetz (“Takeover statute”), any entity obtaining a controlling
interest in a corporation must launch a bid on all the outstanding shares.
The statute provided for a rebuttable presumption that holding thirty
percent of the voting rights, including if such ownership is attained by
acting in concert with others, represents a controlling interest. The
mandatory tender offer had to be launched at a price not lower than the
average market price of the relevant securities over a period of six months
preceding the acquisition of the controlling interest, and in any case not
lower than fifteen percent below the highest price paid or promised by the
bidder in the twelve months preceding the triggering event. 19
It is relevant for our purposes to note that in the years before the
enactment of the Takeover statute there had been two attempted, albeit
unsuccessful, hostile takeovers of Austrian listed corporations: one in 1997
over Krems Chemie AG and one in 1998 over VOEST Alpine
Eisenbahnsysteme AG. After the adoption of the statute, since 2006, there
have been no overtly hostile takeover attempts. 20 The absence of formally
hostile takeovers implications does not always provide an accurate picture
of the market for corporate control because apparently friendly acquisitions
might be conducted under the threat of a hostile offer. Nevertheless, it is
significant that after the adoption of the “British-style” mandatory bid,
overtly hostile takeovers have vanished from Austria.
Italy is another paradigmatic case. The first takeover statute was
enacted in 1992, and it provided that any entity that intended to acquire, or
had acquired, a controlling interest in a listed corporation should launch a
tender offer. The tender offer could be partial, because the law only
required it to be extended to the percentage of shares that would grant
control, and the price of the offer could be freely set by the bidder. There
were two major problems with this approach. First, for every listed
corporation, it was necessary to indicate the controlling threshold, which
could vary even overnight. Second, the mandatory offer was not on all the
outstanding shares, and therefore an exit was not granted to all
shareholders.
Also in light of these issues in 1998 a new comprehensive statute on
financial markets regulation (so-called Testo Unico della Finanza,
hereinafter also “T.U.F.”) profoundly reformed takeover rules. The new
approach followed, with respect both to mandatory bids and defensive
measures by the target corporation, the U.K. regulatory structure. In
particular, pursuant to Article 106 of the T.U.F., any entity that acquired
18. FESE, Share Ownership Structure in Europe, February 2007.
19. Scott V. Simpson et al., The Future of Takeover Regulation in Europe, 1575
PLI/CORP 725, 765 (2006).
20. Id. at 756.
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thirty percent of the full voting (“ordinary”) shares of a listed corporation
would be obliged to launch a tender offer on all the remaining full voting
shares. The price for the bid was to be no lower than the average of the
average market price of the twelve months preceding the acquisition, and
the highest price paid by the bidder in the same period of time. The same
piece of legislation also introduced a non-frustration rule (Article 104 of
the T.U.F.), which provided that once a bid had been launched the directors
of the target corporation could not initiate or continue any action that might
frustrate the bid without shareholder approval. This rule forbade them, for
instance, from increasing its costs for the acquirer without the approval of
shareholders representing at least thirty percent of the capital entitled to
vote. Later I will take up the dynamics of hostile takeovers in Italy
following these legislative innovations. But for now it is important to
simply point out that there was a spontaneous convergence toward the
British approach throughout Europe before the Directive 25/2004/CE.
The different path followed by Spain does not negate this general
trend. Until the recent Law 6/2007 of April 12, 2007, which implemented
the XIII Directive, the Iberian monarchy adopted an elaborate and
complicated system that had evolved through the years. The first
regulation was introduced with the Real Decreto 1848/1980 of September
5, 1980, and the last amendments were contained in the Real Decreto
432/2003 of April 11, 2003. Instead of describing the system in detail
here, 21 it is worth noting that the threshold triggering a mandatory offer
was set at a percentage lower than thirty percent. The basic framework of
the regulation provided that the acquisition or the intention to acquire
twenty-five percent of the voting shares of a listed corporation was
sufficient to mandate a tender offer. However, the mandatory offer could
be compelled in many other cases. In particular, if five percent
participation was acquired and, with that ownership the buyer could
appoint a certain number of directors, that indicated a significant influence
on the governance of the issuer. Spain did not, however, apply the “onehundred percent rule,” in the sense that the law only required a partial bid
(on at least ten percent of the outstanding shares). While this approach
clearly made hostile tender offers less expensive as compared to the British
Takeover Code, it also set the threshold of the mandatory (partial) bid at a
particularly low level with respect to the average controlling participation.
Germany represented for many years an exception to the Continental
European convergence toward the U.K. system. Germany was in fact a
quite strong opponent of the adoption of the XIII Directive and, in
particular, of its non-frustration rules. 22 German opposition, however, was
21. See LA SOCIEDAD COTIZADA 605 (Fernando Vives & Javier Pérez Ardà eds.,
Marcial Pons 2006) (providing further analysis).
22. See John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Company and
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not based on resistance to the British approach generally, but instead a
more immediate concern that an uneven playing field would develop in
Europe that might have made German corporations more vulnerable to
hostile acquisitions from bidders located in other countries. Despite these
concerns, even before the approval of the XIII Directive, Germany did
enact a new takeover law in 2002 (the Wertpapierwerbs undUbernahmegesetz or “WpÜG”, followed by secondary regulation contained
in the so-called WpÜG-Angebotsverordnungs), which shared the basic
pillars of that regulation. According to the new rules, the acquisition of a
thirty percent participation, in the absence of a different de facto
controlling shareholder, would trigger a mandatory tender offer on all of
the outstanding shares. 23
These various examples illustrate a trend that can be seen throughout
Europe. Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of European systems from
English, French, and German legal origins that have adopted two pillars of
the British Takeover Code in some form or other: the mandatory bid and
the passivity rule. The chart demonstrates that from 1995 to 2004, meaning
before the necessary implementation of the XIII Directive, there has been a
steady increase in the number of continental European countries that have
spontaneously adopted this approach.

Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 LAW & POL’Y 355 (2002)
(discussing reactions to the German company law reformation from various stakeholders).
23. An overview of the 2001 takeover statute in English can be read in JOHANNES
ADOLFF ET AL., PUBLIC COMPANY TAKEOVERS IN GERMANY (Verlag C.H. Beck 2002) and in
GABRIELE APFELBACHER et al., GERMAN TAKEOVER LAW: A COMMENTARY (Verlag C.H.
Beck 2002). For a discussion of possible implications of the German approach, in which the
title itself clarifies the author’s position, see Jeffrey Gordon, An American Perspective on
the New German Anti-Takeover Law, European Corporate Governance Inst. Working Paper
No. 02/2002), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=336420.
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Figure 3 - Percentage of countries that have adopted the rule
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If the adoption of these rules would have an effect on the market for
corporate control and, in particular, would enhance the chances of a valuemaximizing change of control, either friendly or hostile, one could expect
an increase in the takeovers and mergers and acquisition activity following
their enactment.
Of course, numerous complex variables affect
acquisitions, including some macroeconomic determinants that are
independent from the local regulatory framework. It is, however,
reasonable to question whether these rules actually favor takeovers if their
enactment does not seem to correspond with takeover activity. To that end,
Figure 4 indicates the number of takeover announcements in Europe from
1993 to 2001.
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Figure 4 - Takeover announcements in Europe
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Just looking at the total number of takeovers, this snapshot from the
late nineties, during a so-called “takeover wave,” does not seem to
positively correlate with the rise of a regulatory framework similar to the
pro-takeover British approach. The same is true, and even more so, for
hostile takeovers. In Figure 3, the years 1995 and 2000 have been
highlighted as benchmarks to mark the growing adoption of the mandatory
bid rule and the passivity rule. Even this simple and rough comparison
suggests that the takeover wave of the nineties was independent from the
converging of the regulatory framework.
Moreover, even further
convergence toward the British regulatory model after 2000 was not
followed by an increase, but rather by a drop, in the number of both
friendly and hostile takeovers.
This conclusion is even more striking if we break down the data by
country. Figure 5 indicates that the vast majority of hostile deals took
place in the U.K., which once again suggests that the adoption of the pillars
of the British approach to takeovers, in continental Europe, did not have a
significant effect on the contestability of corporate control.
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Figure 5 - Hostile Takeover Announcements in
Europe 1993 - 2001
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IV. AN OVERVIEW OF HOW THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE HAS BEEN
IMPLEMENTED
It is not within the scope of this Article to analyze either the
substantive content of the Thirteenth Directive, or the numerous and
articulated issues concerning its implementation in the individual Member
States. As mentioned in the introduction, I will instead use one country,
Italy, as a case study. With respect to the overall European landscape,
however, the more general point is that, in many Continental European
countries, the adoption of the Takeovers Directive has been—to some
extent—used as an opportunity to reduce the contestability of corporate
control or as an occasion to introduce new rules and regulations that might
strengthen the defensive barriers of national enterprises.
Scholars and policymakers have already argued that the
implementation of the Directive might, in many respects, hinder a panEuropean market for corporate control in many respects. 24 It is useful at
24. See Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Implementation of
the Directive on Takeover Bids, (Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, February
21.02.2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids
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this point to review the highlights of those arguments.
First, with respect to the mandatory bid rule, whose adoption is neither
optional nor subject to reciprocity, in adopting the Directive, most States
will have increased the minimum price at which the tender offer should be
launched, which as will be discussed later is also the case with Italy. This
price increase raises the overall cost of a change of control, in particular
when connected to a hostile acquisition. This element might affect the
efficiency of the market for corporate control.
Secondly, implementation of the board neutrality rule and of the
breakthrough rule has not increased the contestability of corporate control,
but has instead probably lowered it. According to the European
Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Directive, as of
February 2007, among the fourteen Member States where the Directive had
been implemented, board neutrality was already provided for in some
manner in thirteen States (either at the statutory level or through selfregulation). Therefore, it was not an innovation brought by the Directive.
Additionally, in five out of these thirteen States, board neutrality had been
made subject to reciprocity according to Article 12 of Directive
2004/25/CE, whereas the same requirement was strictly mandatory before
the Directive. According to the Commission itself, this development “will
very likely hold back the emergence of an open takeover market, rather
than promote it.” 25
Based on these observations, it is now possible to add two important
European countries, Spain and Italy, which have adopted the Directive after
the issuance of the above-mentioned Report. Notably, both countries opted
for reciprocity with respect to board neutrality and breakthrough rules. 26
In addition, all the Member States that did not provide for mandatory
board neutrality before the Directive decided to implement it only on an

/index_en.htm (concluding that a “large number of Member States have shown strong
reluctance to lift takeover barriers . . . . The number of Member States implementing the
Directive in a seemingly protectionist way is unexpectedly large.”) For commentary on the
Report in Italian, see Andrea Angelillis & Chiara Mosca, Considerazioni sul recepimento
della tredicesima direttiva in materia di offerte pubbliche di acquisto e sulla posizione
espressa nel documento della Commissione Europea, 52/5 RIV. SOC. 1106 (2007). Doubts
about the capability of the Directive to create an active market for corporate control in
Europe have been expressed by, among others, Matteo Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and
Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive, 6 EBOR 552 (2005). For criticism of the
Directive, as was expressed at an early stage of the drafting of the final version of the
Directive, in particular because reciprocity would have hindered the market for corporate
control, see Marco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers, ECGI Law Working Paper 14/2003,
available at .
25. Report, supra note 24, at 6.
26. See respectively Article 104-ter of the Italian Testo Unico della Finanza, and
Articles 60-bis, Par. 2 and 60-ter, Par. 4 of the Spanish Ley 24/1988 of July 28, 1988, as
amended by the Ley 6/2007 of April 12, 2007.
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optional basis pursuant to Article 12 of the Directive, with the single
exception of Malta. Similarly, very few Member States have imposed the
breakthrough rule on their national corporations, providing for its
application only on an optional basis.
Therefore, in several Member States, there is a sort of double level of
protection for corporations. First, board neutrality and/or breakthrough
rules are optional and the shareholders’ meeting of the issuer can decide
whether or not to introduce them in the bylaws. Second, even when this
option is invoked, the actual application of the rules is subject to
reciprocity. For instance, this is true in the case of Spain with respect to the
breakthrough rule (Article 60-ter of the Ley del Mercado de Valores
24/1988). 27
It should also be observed that, together with the implementation of
the Directive, some Member States have also adopted “collateral measures”
that might help raise barriers to hostile takeovers. For example, with the
same statute that implemented the Thirteenth Directive, Loi n° 2006-387 of
March 31, 2006, the French legislature introduced a new type of poison pill
in the form of free warrants (bons de souscription), which can be issued to
existing shareholders. In case of a tender offer, these warrants give the
right to subscribe new shares at a significant discount to the investors that
have not tendered their participation. 28 The shareholders’ meeting approval
of this measure can also decide which offers will trigger the rights (for
example, only hostile bids) and can also delegate, within a defined
framework, the authority to issue the warrants to the board of directors.
Without analyzing here the regulation of these new instruments, nor
discussing their compatibility with either the Directive or other European
law principles such as the free movement of capitals set forth by Article 56
of the EC Treaty, 29 it is worth noting that, once again, the implementation

27. This legislative technique raises the question of its compatibility with Article 12 of
the Directive. According to one interpretation, reciprocity would be allowed only when
board neutrality and breakthrough are mandated by the state, as it is in the U. K. rather then
when the state does not impose them, and single corporations are to voluntary opt-in these
provisions. Besides these hermeneutic problems, however, it is clear that the general picture
is one of higher protections for incumbents.
28. See Martin Arnold & Tobias Buck, French ‘Poison Pill’ Strategy May Breach EU
Rules, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?
news_id=fto022120061334518086&page=1; Martin Arnold & Tobias Buck, French Use of
‘Poison Pill’ Strategy Pushes EU Takeover Rules to Limit, Feb. 22, 2006, FINANCIAL TIMES;
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Implementation in France of the Takeover Directive and the New
French Poison Pill (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.shearman.com/ma_040606/.
29. For an extensive interpretation of Article 56 of the European Treaty, and a
discussion on the potential “horizontal application” of the “freedom of capitals” principle
also among private parties, see Philippe Vigneron & Philippe Steinfeld, La Communauté
Européenne et la Libre Circulation des Capitaux: les Nouvelles Dispositions et Leurs
Implications, 32/3-4 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 401, 430 (1996).
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of the Directive has been used by some European legislatures as an
occasion to introduce new and powerful protections for incumbents.
V.

A PARADIGMATIC CASE-STUDY: ITALY

For the reasons described above, Italy provides a representative and
helpful example of the phenomenon under examination. This country
presents, with respect to the ownership structure of listed corporations and
to the financial actors most able to influence the regulatory process,
features almost opposite to the United Kingdom. Controlling shareholders,
often an individual or a family, usually own significantly more than thirty
percent of the voting shares. Institutional investors have a growing, but
still marginal, role when compared to their counterparts in the U.K., as
described above. 30 Moreover, they tend to be quite passive when it comes
to corporate governance. 31 Notwithstanding this contrasting factual
background, Italy adopted the British approach to takeovers in 1998, when
it introduced both the mandatory bid and the non-frustration rule, together
with an embryonic form of breakthrough rule concerning shareholders’
agreements.
Have these rules fostered the market for corporate control? Did they
really protect minority shareholders, or did they entrench existing
incumbents? Do the changes recently introduced by the XIII Directive
make hostile acquisitions easier or more difficult? Has the implementation
of the European legislation been used to perfect barriers to unfriendly bids?
There is no single, clear-cut answer to all of these questions. Instead,
using the Italian example, I will examine whether the existing empirical
data suggests that the analysis provided by Armour and Skeel comparing
the U.S. and the U.K. extends to the development of takeover regulation in
continental Europe. To this end, I will examine three takeover rules:
mandatory bids, board neutrality, and the breakthrough rule. I will also
consider takeover activity and resulting ownership structures.
30. See discussion above.
31. Marcello Bianchi & Luca Enriques, Corporate Governance in Italy After the 1998
Reform: What Role for Institutional Investors? 43 CONSOB—QUADERNI DI FINANZA
(2001), argued that there was room for institutional investors’ activism in Italy, basing their
conclusion on elements such as the average voting participation hold by these investors, the
degree of concentration in the industry that might affect coordination problems among
investors, and their investment strategy. The authors also point out, however, potential
limitations to activism due to conflicts of interest of mutual funds belonging to banking
groups and to the ownership concentration of the issuers in which they invest. The few
existing empirical analysis confirm a relatively low level of activism. See also Alessandro
Cortese & Paola Musile Tanzi, Investitori istituzionali e corporate governance. Forme di
attivismo e modalità di realizzazione, Giuseppe Airoldi & Giancarlo Forestieri (editors),
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. ANALISI E PROSPETTIVE DEL CASO ITALIANO, Milano: Etas Libri
(1998), 131 ff.
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Mandatory bids.

As discussed above, in light of the average stake of the controlling
shareholder, in Italy as well as in other European jurisdictions, a change of
control rarely occurs without triggering the obligation to launch a tender
offer. Before the implementation of Directive 2004/25/CE, Italian law
provided that whoever acquired more than thirty percent of the full-voting
shares should launch an offer on those shares at a set price. 32 The price
was the arithmetic average between two elements: the average weighted
market price of the twelve months preceding the triggering event and the
highest price agreed upon by the bidder in the same period for the same
shares. The rule’s purpose is to ensure minority shareholders a fair price
based on market conditions taking into account the highest price paid by
the bidder, i.e. a price that includes the premium for control. With this
formula, only part of the premium for control was granted to minority
shareholders. This price rule attempted to protect minority shareholders
while reducing the overall cost of the takeover for the bidder.
Implementing the Directive, the Italian legislature has introduced the
“best-price rule” provided for by Article 5 of the Directive. The new text
of Article 106 T.U.F. establishes that the price offered should not be less
than the highest price paid by the bidder in the twelve months preceding the
(communication of) the acquisition of the triggering threshold.
Consider some important recent takeovers that have occurred on the
Italian market before the implementation of the Takeover Directive,
sometimes involving foreign bidders, and what the minimum price of the
tender offer would have been if the new rules had already been adopted. 33
A first example is the takeover that occurred in November of 2006 of
the insurance company Toro by its competitor Generali. 34 The highest
price paid by the bidder was equal to 21.20 euro, and the average market
price was 15.36 euro. The minimum price at which, theoretically, the offer
on all the outstanding shares had to be launched according to the pre32. More precisely, the rule requires thirty percent of the shares granting a voting right
concerning the appointment or removal of the directors, although no listed corporations
issued these types of limited voting shares.
33. Concerning methodology, as in any case when one plays “what if . . .” with past
events, it could be argued that, if the new rules were already in place when these
transactions occurred, the dynamics of the market prices and the behavior of the parties
involved would have been different. Therefore, assuming all the variables are equal,
applying the new minimum price rule is not correct. This observation is undoubtedly wellgrounded. The point of this simulation, however, is not to predict exactly what would have
happened with a different regulatory framework, which is an impossible task, but, rather to
provide an idea of the possible effects of the new rules looking at actual cases.
34. The prospectus of the tender offer, from which the information reported in the text
is taken, is available on the website of the Italian Stock Exchange Commission at
www.consob.it.
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Directive rule was, therefore, 18.28 euro. Applying the new best-price rule
after the Directive the offer could not be made for less than 21.20 euro per
share. Considering the number of the existing outstanding shares
(63,205,726), the difference in the overall (potential) minimum cost of the
acquisition would have amounted to approximately 185 million euro or
about sixteen percent more than the corresponding figure applying the
previous rules.
A similar analysis could be conducted with respect to the takeover of
the Italian bank Antonveneta by the Dutch bank ABN (March 2006), which
was linked to the scandal that lead to the resignation of the former governor
of the Italian Central Bank, Antonio Fazio. 35 Using the same methods of
calculation, the overall minimum (potential) cost of the acquisition would
have been 246,000,000 euro higher than before the XIII Directive. 36 While
the cost of a takeover is not the only driver in the market for corporate
control, especially when liquidity abounds on financial markets and in light
of the capital gains that the bidder would be able to enjoy after the
acquisition, such significant differences can undermine the economic
feasibility of a takeover.
The two tender offers mentioned, however, might be considered only
partially exemplary of the problem, because in both cases the bidder,
independently from what the law would have required, voluntarily decided
to offer to all shareholders not only a price higher than the minimum, but
one equal to the highest price paid. In other words, the bidders anticipated
the rule set forth by the Directive and, as a result, made their proposals
more attractive.
There are, however, many cases in which the bidder did not, or could
not, follow a similar strategy, including two interesting examples
concerning both “small” and “big” offers. First, there is the acquisition of
the Dada Corporation by RCS, one of the most important Italian publishing
corporations which published the premier Italian newspaper, Corriere della
Sera, which took place in December 2005. The second example involves
the takeover of Edison SpA by the French energy colossus EDF in October
2005, which also attracted international attention. In the first case the
bidder offered the then minimum legal price of 12.75 euro per share, versus
a minimum price that would have resulted from the Directive’s rule of
14.30 euro. Similarly, EDF offered 1.86 euro per share instead of 2.18.
This would have meant a difference of approximately 11 million euro and
417 million euro, respectively. Notwithstanding the different scale of the
two transactions, in the RCS/Dada case the acquisition would have cost an
additional 12 percent and for EDF/Edison an increase of 17 percent.
35. See Year-End Accounts. Antonio Fazio, governor of the Bank of Italy, resigns.
About time, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2005.
36. Data are again available on the prospectuses available at www.consob.it
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Not only do the new rules make bidders pay more in terms of
minimum price, but the number of shares that they must be ready to buy
can also be significantly higher, thus increasing the overall consideration
paid for the target. Before the implementation of the Directive, Article 106
T.U.F. simply required that the mandatory tender offer be extended to all
the full voting shares or, more precisely, to the shares attributing the right
to vote for the nomination and removal of directors (in brief, ordinary
shares). Thus, the offer should have been made to, all but only to, the
shares that would count for the determination of the triggering threshold.
This rule has changed with the introduction of European legislation.
Now it is compulsory to launch an offer on all the voting shares, including
limited voting shares that only vote in extraordinary shareholders’ meetings
or only on specific issues. If, for example, a corporation has issued one
hundred ordinary, full-voting shares and eighty preferred shares with
limited voting rights, (for example, permitting voting only on amendments
of the bylaws), before the implementation of the Directive, any entity that
acquired thirty-one shares of the former category had to be ready to buy the
remaining sixty-nine. Now the bidder must also offer to acquire,
additionally, the eighty preferred shares. Considering that the minimum
price for the offer on these shares might be different, and usually lower,
than the one paid for full-voting shares, it is clear that this difference might
further increase the overall cost of a takeover significantly, especially when
hostile.
Such a conclusion is particularly true in a system, like the Italian one,
where the use of limited voting shares is a common practice (thirty-five
percent of listed corporations have outstanding limited voting shares), even
if their capitalization is relatively low (accounting for approximately seven
percent of the overall market capitalization in Italy), because these shares
are often quoted at a discount to full-voting shares. 37
The above analysis underlines that the bidder should be ready to pay a
very high consideration in order to acquire control of a listed corporation
after the implementation of the Takeover Directive. In contrast, the distinct
ownership structures in the U.K. mean that the mandatory bid will be
triggered for virtually any change of control, which constitutes a potentially
powerful protective mechanism for existing incumbents that want to resist
a hostile bid. This is, of course, the other side of the coin of minority
shareholder protection. The new rules are intended to treat small investors
better, at least on paper. The question, however, is to what extent this
ostensibly better treatment will actually deter, rather than foster, takeovers.
One last point to consider is that the mandatory bid might appear

37. EMILIO BARUCCI, MERCATO DEI CAPITALI E CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ITALIA 97,
(Carocci 2006).
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favorable to minority shareholders in the case of a friendly acquisition
where the existing controlling shareholder sells its participation, or a
significant part thereof, to an acquirer. In such a scenario, the same price
per share recognized by the seller must be offered to all of the shareholders.
However, the parties will take this element into account in their
negotiations, thus raising as a preliminary issue whether the new rule might
also deter friendly takeovers. 38
B.

Prohibition of directors’ controlled frustrating actions

Together with the mandatory bid mechanism, the non-frustration
prohibition—also called “board neutrality” or the “passivity rule”—is the
landmark difference between U.S. and U.K. approaches to takeovers. The
degree of freedom enjoyed by American directors in structuring and
deploying pre- and post-bid defenses, with the only substantive limitation
being their fiduciary duties, is unknown in the U.K. and in those European
countries that have adopted the U.K. approach. The non-frustration
prohibition of the General Principle 3 of Rule 21 of the U.K. Takeover
Code prevents directors from either adopting or setting into motion most
post-bid defenses. It also requires an explicit vote by the general
shareholders’ meeting. Extensive debate exists whether greater leeway in
resisting a takeover—as is the case in the U.S.—favors shareholders. 39
However, with a caveat that will be discussed later, it cannot be denied that
board neutrality and shareholder choice in the U.K. were perceived and
introduced as protections against directors’ and managers’ conflicts of
interest in a takeover contest. This purpose is confirmed in the legislative
history of the provision.

38. There is a subtle but interesting issue worth mentioning. If we carefully compare
the old and new versions of Article 106 T.U.F. with respect to the minimum price of the
mandatory bid, it is stated that the “highest price agreed upon” by the bidder (albeit in the
calculation of the average) shall be taken into account first. This formula was intended to
uphold the spirit of the law, i.e., when the seller and the buyer agree upon a certain price, the
latter pays after the launch of the tender offer, not before it. The reference to prices
(actually) paid and (simply) agreed upon was meant to avoid this possible objection. The
new text refers simply to the highest price “paid” by the bidder, providing, however, that
Consob can require that a higher price be offered, with a motivated decision, if the bidder,
or subjects acting in concert with it, have agreed upon a price higher than the one paid.
Notwithstanding this possible “correction” by Consob, the fact that the law now only refers
to “paid” prices might affect the ability of the bidder, in a friendly offer, to pay a different
price to minority shareholders and to the former controlling shareholder.
39. Thus, the inventor of the “poison pill” should be enlisted among advocates of
managers-controlled takeover defenses as a protection for shareholders. Martin Lipton,
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987); c.f.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 162 (Harvard University Press 1991).
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A recent and insightful analysis, however, questions whether this rule
is truly important or merely illusory. 40 David Kershaw persuasively argues
that in the very jurisdiction where the non-frustration rule developed, most
takeover defenses would also require shareholder approval in the absence
of this rule. General company law principles, he argues, end up requiring
the same. More precisely, Kershaw concludes that “in the absence of the
non-frustration prohibition not only would post-bid, directors-controlled
ETDs [takeover defenses] require pre-bid shareholders consent but when
made available there is limited scope to use them for entrenchment
purposes”. 41
To the extent that this theory is well-grounded in the U.K., even
without a detailed analysis of corporate law in civil law systems, it is fair to
say that in countries such as Italy, a similar conclusion would be even more
justified. In these systems, the extent and relevance of the competences of
the shareholders’ meeting versus the directors are even broader than in
common law systems. Under Italian law, notwithstanding the fact that the
2003 reform entrusted directors with much more significant powers
especially with respect to the financial structure of the corporation, the
shareholders’ meeting still retains significant powers on deciding or
authorizing most corporate actions that might be used as defenses in a
hostile takeover context. 42 The issuing of option rights to subscribe or
acquire the target’s shares at a discount, as well as most business
combinations (e.g., mergers, spin-offs, contributions in kind), are used to
increase the corporation’s capital. These examples, among others, are all
subject to shareholders’ approval independent of the passivity rule. Of
course, this does not necessarily imply that the rule is not useful. In
particular, its application calls for a “re-approval” of pre-bids decisions visà-vis the actual tender offer. Thus, it is possible to downgrade the potential
impact of the passivity rule on the distribution of corporate powers in the
Italian system.
Independent of the scope of the non-frustration rule, the crucial point
40. David Kershaw, The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover
Defence Prohibition, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2007).
41. Id. at 306.
42. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent
Italian Reform and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective
Regulatory Competition, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 113, 130 (2004) (extending a similar
observation to several civil law systems for Spain); Ignacio Lojendio Osborne, La Junta
general de accionistas, in Guillermo J. Jiménez Sánchez (editor), DERECHO MERCANTIL,
Ariel (2006), at 344; Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier, Florence Deboissy, Droit des
Sociétés, LexisNexis Litec (2006), at 223 ff.; see also Gerhard Wirth, Michael Arnold, Mark
Greene, CORPORATE LAW IN GERMANY, Beck (2004), at 117 ff.; Marc Löbbe, Corporate
Groups : Competences of the Shareholders’ Meeting and Minority Protection—The
German Federal Court of Justice’s Recent Gelatine and Macrotron Cases Redefine the
Holzmüller Doctrine, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1057 (2004).
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is that determining at shareholders’ meetings whether defenses in systems
where the most important agency problem is between controlling
shareholders holding a majority of the shares and minority investors may
not be in the best interest of the minority shareholders.
Needless to say, such a rule is better than nothing. The fact that a
defense must be approved (or re-approved) by the shareholders’ meeting
implies several important advantages for minorities. First and foremost, it
has the advantage of increasing the transparency of the adoption of a
frustrating action. In fact, even if a defense adopted unilaterally by the
directors would also be subject to specific disclosure obligations if it
involved price-sensitive information, 43 passage through the shareholders’
meeting allows organized minorities to discuss the measure and to obtain
further information from the directors. In addition, the existence of a
shareholders’ meeting resolution creates at least the potential for legal
action, such as challenging the resolution. It may create the potential for
obtaining a preliminary injunction from the court inhibiting the adoption of
the defense. The resolution might be challenged, for instance, on the
grounds that the majority shareholder has a conflict of interest or that it is
exercising its power in an abusive manner. Even if sustaining claims of
this type would be very difficult, it is at least less improbable than if the
decision were taken only by the directors.
In addition, in light of these issues, it is also possible for a controlling
shareholder to approve a defensive measure in the post-bid context. When
a controlling shareholder holds forty percent or more of the voting shares,
opposition by institutional investors can be virtually impossible. In other
words, in a market with a very concentrated ownership structure, to entrust
the shareholders’ meeting with the approval of takeover defenses might be,
to invoke another fable involving predatory animals, like letting the fox
guard the henhouse. This fable, however, comes with an additional,
mischievous twist.
Italian law clearly states that prior authorization at a shareholders’
meeting, when permissible, does not preclude directors’ liability for the
actions that they carry out. 44 When a defensive measure is actually decided
and adopted at a shareholders’ meeting, such as in the case of issuing new
shares, the directors simply “execute” the shareholders’ decision. In these
circumstances, it might be more difficult for a potential plaintiff to allege
that directors breached their duties of care or loyalty. 45 Systems that
43. According to Article 114 T.U.F.
44. T.U.F. art. 104 spells this out with specific respect to the adoption of takeover
defenses by the directors after the shareholders’ meeting authorization, a rule set forth, in
general terms, by C.C. art. 2364.
45. See, e.g., Corte app., Tobor immobiliare v. Oliani, November 5, 1991, in GIUR. IT. I,
2, 384 (1992); and Corte app., La Gaiana v. Società italiana industria zuccheri, GIUR.
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implement the non-frustration rule do not generally rely on directors’
liability to discriminate between lawful and unlawful defenses, as the U.S.
system does. Particularly in that context, the shareholders’ resolution
might reduce the already slim chances that minority shareholders have of
recovering, through a civil action, the damage they suffer as a result of a
non-value maximizing defense. 46
With respect to the implementation of the Takeover Directive in Italy
(but also in other continental European countries), there is one last point to
make concerning reciprocity. It is broadly known that the non-frustration
principle set forth by Article 9 of the Directive, together with the
breakthrough rule that will be discussed in the next part, encountered
significant political opposition at the E.U. level. Passage of the Directive
was ultimately the result of a compromise that provided for an opt-out and
a reciprocity clause applicable to both the non-frustration principle and the
reciprocity clause. Article 12 of the Directive, in fact, allows member
states to opt-out from these two provisions. If states do opt out, however, it
provides that the states’ national corporations must be allowed to adopt
either one or both rules in their bylaws. The same Article 12 also provides
that member states can subject the application of both the non-frustration
rule and the breakthrough rule to reciprocity. In other words, even if these
rules are adopted, they are not applicable if the tender offer is launched by
a “company which does not apply the same” rules “or by a company
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the latter.”
As mentioned above, several continental European countries that,
before the Directive, provided for a mandatory non-frustration rule with no
exceptions whatsoever, took the occasion of the implementation of the
European legislation to add a reciprocity requirement. This was the
approach, for instance, in France, Spain, and Italy. Clearly enough,
reciprocity further limits the protective strength of the non-frustration rule,
to the extent that it has one.
In addition, Spanish law explicitly provides that reciprocity, and
therefore the suspension of the non-frustrating principle, only applies when
the (hostile) offer is launched by an entity not subject to (or not controlled
by an entity that is subject to) the same rules, and whose domicile is not in
Spain. 47 Italian and French law do not make a similar distinction. 48 In

COMM. II, 730 (1988).
46. For discussion of the potential civil liability of the shareholders for their voting in
the shareholders’ meeting and a comparative analysis, see FABRIZIO GUERRERA, LA
RESPONSABILITÀ “DELIBERATIVA” NELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI, Giappichelli (2004).
47. Article 60-bis paragraph 2 of the Ley de Mercado de Valores, as modified by the
Ley 6/2007 of April 12, 2007.
48. See C. COM. art. L. 233-33, which states:
Les dispositions de l'article L. 233-32 ne sont pas applicables lorsque la société
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these countries, therefore, reciprocity might have an even broader scope of
application, because it can also be invoked against national bidders.
In light of these elements, it is difficult to say that the non-frustration
rule, as adopted in Italy and amended with the implementation of the XIII
Directive, resolved the inherent conflict of interest between controlling and
minority shareholders, empowering the market for corporate control.
C.

The Breakthrough Rule

Extensive literature exists regarding the breakthrough rule set forth by
Article 11 of Directive 2004/25/CE, 49 which I will not recount here in
detail. In brief, the rule is designed to neutralize some typical pre-bid
defenses, such as shareholders’ agreements limiting the free transferability
of shares or restricting voting rights, or bylaws clauses that have similar
effects. 50 These provisions, which are either contained in the bylaws of the
fait l'objet d'une ou plusieurs offres publiques engagées par des entités, agissant
seules ou de concert au sens de l'article L. 233-10, dont l'une au moins
n'applique pas ces dispositions ou des mesures équivalentes ou qui sont
respectivement contrôlées, au sens du II ou du III de l'article L. 233-16, par des
entités dont l'une au moins n'applique pas ces dispositions ou des mesures
équivalentes. Toutefois, les dispositions de l'article L. 233-32 s'appliquent si les
seules entités qui n'appliquent pas les dispositions de cet article ou des mesures
équivalentes ou qui sont contrôlées, au sens du II ou du III de l'article L. 23316, par des entités qui n'appliquent pas ces dispositions ou des mesures
équivalentes, agissent de concert, au sens de l'article L. 233-10, avec la société
faisant l'objet de l'offre. Toute contestation portant sur l'équivalence des
mesures fait l'objet d'une décision de l'Autorité des marchés financiers.
Dans le cas où le premier alinéa s'applique, toute mesure prise par le conseil
d'administration, le conseil de surveillance, le directoire, le directeur général ou
l'un des directeurs généraux délégués de la société visée doit avoir été
expressément autorisée pour l'hypothèse d'une offre publique par l'assemblée
générale dans les dix-huit mois précédant le jour du dépôt de l'offre.
L'autorisation peut notamment porter sur l'émission par le conseil
d'administration ou le directoire des bons visés au II de l'article L. 233-32 ; dans
ce cas, l'assemblée générale extraordinaire des actionnaires statue dans les
conditions de quorum et de majorité prévues à l'article L. 225-98.
Under Italian law, T.U.F. art. 104, in the relevant part, provides that board passivity and
breakthrough rules do not apply when the tender offer is promoted by “chi non sia soggetto
a tali disposizioni ovvero a disposizioni equivalenti, ovvero da una società o ente da questi
controllata. In caso di offerta promossa di concerto, è sufficiente che a tali disposizioni non
sia soggetto anche uno solo fra gli offerenti”.
49. For a brief description of the rule, and additional bibliographical references, see
Ventoruzzo, supra note 2.
50. In the relevant part, Article 11 of the directive 2004/25/CE provides that:
2. Any restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in the articles of
association of the offeree company shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during
the time allowed for acceptance of the bid laid down in Article 7(1).
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target corporation or in a separate agreement, do not apply when a
mandatory bid is launched. By the same token, under the breakthrough
rule, mechanisms typically empowering controlling shareholders, such as
multiple-voting shares, permit only one vote per share in a shareholders’
meeting that is called to decide on defensive measures under the board
passivity rule. Special powers granted by the bylaws are also neutralized if
the bidder acquires more than three-quarters of the capital carrying voting
rights.
Once again, the point here is not an analytical interpretation of the
breakthrough rule, but rather a consideration of its possible effects on the

Any restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in contractual
agreements between the offeree company and holders of its securities, or in
contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company's securities
entered into after the adoption of this Directive, shall not apply vis-à-vis the
offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid laid down in
Article 7(1).
3. Restrictions on voting rights provided for in the articles of association of the
offeree company shall not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders
which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with Article 9.
Restrictions on voting rights provided for in contractual agreements between the
offeree company and holders of its securities, or in contractual agreements
between holders of the offeree company's securities entered into after the
adoption of this Directive, shall not have effect at the general meeting of
shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with
Article 9.
Multiple-vote securities shall carry only one vote each at the general meeting of
shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with
Article 9.
4. Where, following a bid, the offeror holds 75% or more of the capital carrying
voting rights, no restrictions on the transfer of securities or on voting rights
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 nor any extraordinary rights of shareholders
concerning the appointment or removal of board members provided for in the
articles of association of the offeree company shall apply; multiple-vote
securities shall carry only one vote each at the first general meeting of
shareholders following closure of the bid, called by the offeror in order to
amend the articles of association or to remove or appoint board members.
To that end, the offeror shall have the right to convene a general meeting of
shareholders at short notice, provided that the meeting does not take place
within two weeks of notification.
5. Where rights are removed on the basis of paragraphs 2, 3, or 4 and/or
Article 12, equitable compensation shall be provided for any loss suffered by
the holders of those rights. The terms for determining such compensation and
the arrangements for its payment shall be set by Member States.
6. Paragraphs 3 and 4 shall not apply to securities where the restrictions on
voting rights are compensated for by specific pecuniary advantages.
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contestability of control. This rule might represent a significant blow to
some of the most important control-enhancing systems put in place by
entrenched shareholders.
Article 11 of the Directive is, however, not mandatory. Member
States can opt out, leaving corporations free to opt in if the market values
such a measure. This is, as mentioned above, the other well known
compromise that was necessary to adopt the Takeover Directive.
Not surprisingly, most European states have opted out of this rule.
This is the case, for instance, in France, Germany, Spain, and the U.K.
Corporations can opt in, of course, but in that case reciprocity is usually
required, with the only exception being the British rules, which provide that
if a corporation decides to adopt the breakthrough rule, the absence of
reciprocity does not make the rule inapplicable.
Italy, interestingly enough, has opted into the breakthrough rule,
although subject to reciprocity. But what is the real effect, in terms of
threat to the entrenched positions of controlling shareholders, of the
adoption of the rule? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider
the most common and relevant control-enhancing mechanisms, or “CEMs”,
used by major corporations in Italy. A report commissioned by the
European Commission has recently been published regarding the
proportionality principle in Europe. 51 The study analyzes CEMs, which are
legal devices used to alter the proportionality between the equity
investment of a shareholder and his actual controlling power within the
corporation. Rather than a general definition, the Report describes CEMs
as follows:
Some of these CEMs are used to allow existing blockholders to
enhance control by leveraging voting power (diversions related to
the One share, One vote principle and pyramid structures). Other
CEMs can function as devices to lock-in control (priority shares,
depository certificates, voting rights ceilings, ownership ceilings,
and supermajority provisions).
Other mechanisms are
represented by particular legal structures adopted by EU
companies (partnerships limited by shares), are related to
privatisation processes (golden shares and the influence of the
State), or are coordination devices such as shareholders
agreements, for example.
Some of these mechanisms are diversions structurally organized by
companies (multiple voting rights shares), while others are organized by
51. Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, INST.
SHAREHOLDER SVCS., SHERMAN & STERLING, & EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. (May, 18
2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/
shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf. (reporting the effects of the proportionality principle
in member states of the European Union.)
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shareholders (voting pacts, pre-emption pacts). 52 Thirteen different types
of CEMs have been examined in sixteen European countries, from Belgium
to the U.K., as well as in some non-European jurisdictions. For every
country, statistics concerning the diffusion of CEMs among listed
corporations are provided. The overall picture is that deviations from the
proportionality principle are widespread in all legal systems, as Figure 6,
reproduced from the cited study, shows:
Figure 6 – Diffusion of CEMs in Europe and Beyond

Source: ISS, Sherman & Sterling and ECGI (2007)
While there is not a perfect correlation, it is clear that CEMs generally
overlap with the most typical pre-bid defenses that might be dismantled by

52. INST. SHAREHOLDER SVCS., SHERMAN & STERLING, & EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE
INST., supra note 51, at 5.
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the breakthrough provision. According to this Report, some of the CEMs
adopted by a sample of twenty large Italian corporations, and particularly
relevant for the present discussion, are indicated in Table 3.
Table 3—CEMs used by a sample of 20 large Italian listed corporations
(source: ISS, Sherman & Sterling, ECGI 2007)
Multiple voting right
Voting rights
0
2
shares
ceilings
Non-voting shares without
0
Ownership ceilings
6
preference
Non-voting
shares

preference

Pyramid structures

6

Golden shares

4

9

Shareholders
agreements

8

It is also worth nothing that several of the most prevalent CEMs and
pre-bid defenses are not neutralized by the breakthrough rule. This is the
case of non-voting shares with preference, because a specific provision of
Article 11, paragraph 6, of the Directive, which is replicated in the Italian
legislation, provides that the rule “shall not apply to securities where the
restrictions on voting rights are compensated for by specific pecuniary
advantages.” Pyramid structures, which cannot be simply defined as a
takeover defense, but surely allow a leverage effect that facilitates
shareholders’ entrenchment, also remain unscathed by the breakthrough
rule. 53
Shareholders’ agreements, important protection devices, are probably
the most significant example of CEMs that would be neutralized by the
breakthrough rule. Once again, however, this provision, at least in the case
of a mandatory tender offer, was already provided for by the Italian
legislature before the enactment of the Takeover Directive. Since 1998,
Article 123 T.U.F. provides the right of withdrawal in order to tender
shares from all shareholders’ agreement in case of a mandatory bid. In
addition, it should be kept in mind that the real and effective disincentive
for the members of a shareholders’ agreement not to turn their backs on the
other members and to tender their shares does not have much to do with the
risk of being sued for breach of contract. Instead, it has been shown to rest
on social norms and the potential consequences of a similar treason in a
system with significant cross-shareholdings and interlocking directors.
53. But see Stefano Mengoli, Federica Pazzaglia & Elena Sapienza, Is It Still Pizza,
Spaghetti and Mandolino? Effect of Governance Reforms on Corporate Ownership in Italy,
last revised March 18, 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=966085 (indicating that
pyramids have recently been decreasing).
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In addition, reciprocity should also be considered. As mentioned, if
the bid is launched by an entity that is not subject to the breakthrough rule,
or controlled by an entity not subject to it, the neutralization provision
would not be applicable in any case. 54 Because most European countries
have opted out of the breakthrough provision, it is likely that, in the case of
a takeover of an Italian corporation by a foreign corporation, the
breakthrough rule will not apply.
Moreover, even when the breakthrough rule applies, in light of how it
has been regulated in Italy, it might provide an additional disincentive for
hostile takeovers. Article 11, paragraph 5, establishes that when a
shareholder loses a right as a consequence of the application of the
breakthrough rule, for instance when a preemptive right provided for by a
shareholders’ agreement is neutralized, then “equitable compensation shall
be provided.” The terms for this compensation must be regulated by the
individual Member States. According to Article 104–bis, paragraph 5,
T.U.F., under Italian law equitable compensation must be paid by the
bidder if the offer is successful.
Under this rule, the implication is that the consequences of the
neutralization of CEMs used by the controlling shareholder should be born
by the acquirer of the corporation. Not only does this rule increase the
overall cost of the tender offer, but it also grants to the existing controlling
shareholders a cause of action through which anti-takeover litigation might
be initiated. In this respect, it seems to weaken the very goal of the
breakthrough rule by making entrenched shareholders less vulnerable to the
market for corporate control. 55
54. The only exception are shareholders’ agreements in the case of a mandatory bid,
from which, pursuant to Article 123 T.U.F., it is always possible to withdraw independently
from the rules applicable to the bidder in order to tender the shares.
55. When this article was already in page-proofs, the Italian government enacted a
decree that, if approved by the parliament, will significantly affect takeover regulation. In
the light of the recent financial crisis, and the current bear market, the legislature grew
concerned that Italian corporations might become subject to attacks from hostile bidders, in
particular foreign ones. In order to avoid this and protect national enterprises and their
controlling shareholders, on November 29th, the government opted out of both board
neutrality and breakthrough rule. Consequently, as it happens in Germany and the
Netherlands, listed corporations can opt in one or both rules, but if they do not the directors
appointed by the majority enjoy more freedom in adopting defensive measures against an
unwelcome bidder, and bylaws can more effectively provide for stable pre-bid defenses.
This possible regulatory innovation does not affect the soundness of the analysis conducted
in this article. More specifically, it remains true that both the passivity rule and the
breakthrough rule, in the Italian context – as well as in other systems with concentrated
ownership structures – did not significantly increased the number of hostile acquisitions
fostering a more active market for corporate control. In a way, this partial reform, confirms
the underlying thesis that if there is a concrete fear of hostile takeovers, especially by
foreign bidders, local policy makers change the rules in order to further protect local
incumbents.
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VI. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING TAKEOVERS
To recap briefly, Armour and Skeel’s explanation of the divergent
developments of U.K. and U.S. takeover regulations emphasizes the
definitive role played by institutional investors in the U.K. The role of
institutional investors cannot, however, explain adoption of the pillars of
the U.K. approach—mandatory bids and the non-frustration principle—in
continental European legal systems characterized by a concentrated
ownership structure and relatively weak institutional investors. This leaves
open the question of what forces might have led to the adoption of those
provisions. The above analysis has shown, initially, that mandatory bids
with strong block-holders may actually protect incumbents by making the
acquisition of control more expensive. Similarly, the board neutrality rule,
in a system where the controlling shareholder holds a significant
participation interest (often exceeding fifty percent of the voting shares),
does not really subvert the power of the incumbents to resist hostile
takeovers. Instead, it may actually favor the adoption of defenses that have
fewer risks in terms of liability for the directors.
Given these conditions, even if institutional investors are not the
primary actors, the public choice account that Armour and Skeel give for
divergent approaches in the U.S. and U.K. seems coherent with the
developments in continental Europe. The evolution of takeover regulation
appears to favor the subjects more likely to exercise a significant political
influence on the rule-making process; but in this instance, it is the
entrenched controlling shareholders who exercise it.
While this answer seems intuitive, the question remains whether there
is empirical or anecdotal evidence to support these intuitions. Consider
once again the Italian case. The pillars of what we have defined as the
U.K. approach, now adopted by the European Union, were introduced in
1998. What has happened in terms of takeover dynamics, and in particular
hostile takeovers, since then? Did the market for corporate control register
significant developments?
Before looking at numbers, consider the response of the Italian
Ministry for Economy to the drafted legislation implementing the XIII
Directive to the Parliament in 2007:
I would like to underline some statistical data. First of all, the
acquisitions of Italian listed corporations by foreign subjects and
vice-versa are roughly equivalent. The empiric evidence of the
last seven-eight years indicates that, more or less, we buy abroad
as much as foreigners buy in Italy. There are some important
Italian firms have been bought by foreign subjects (Antonveneta
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and BNL), as well as foreign enterprises (Endesa or Gitec in the
USA) acquired by main actors of the Italian economy. In
addition, I want to remark an often overlooked issue. Hostile
takeovers, non-friendly acquisitions are extremely rare. Down
memory lane we can recall Olivetti-Telecom, or Generali-INA,
but from 1999 to present days there have been very few relevant
hostile deals. Of course some apparently friendly offers were
initiated as non-friendly, I do not want to deny that, but the
important cases are a very limited number. If, in addition, we
consider hostile bids from foreign corporations, it is even more
difficult to find relevant precedents . . . . The issues of the
passivity and break-through rules, and of the level-playing field
with the other legal systems must be protected, but in these years
it did not cause significant hostile cross-border takeovers on
Italian targets, and frankly not even the other way around. 56
Actual data on hostile bids confirm this statement. In the period 19932001, for instance, there were 79 domestic and 13 cross-border hostile
tender offer takeovers in the U.K. These numbers alone exceed the
combined number of all the hostile bids that occurred in seven of the most
important European economies: Austria (0 domestic, 3 cross-border),
Belgium (0 either domestic or cross-border), France (13 domestic, 1 crossborder), Germany (2 domestic and 1 cross-border), Italy (3 domestic and 1
cross-border), Portugal (0 either domestic or cross-border), and Spain (7
domestic, 0 cross-border). The comparison with Italy is quite striking. As
Figure 7 shows, the annual average number of hostile takeovers in the U.S.,
U.K. and Italy across the 1990s illustrates this point:

56. Massimo Tononi, Vice-Sec’y of State for Econ. and Fin.,, available at:
http://new.camera.it/_dati/lavori/stencomm/06/audiz2/2007/0725/s010.htm (speech to the
Parliamentary Commission illustrating the drafted legislative decree implementing the
takeover directive).
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Figure 7 - Average number of hostile bids per year
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With respect to Italy, this evidence is consistent with the likely
preferences of the most influential actors in a system characterized by
concentrated ownership structure and relatively weak institutional
investors. If we consider the evolution of the ownership structure of Italian
corporations, comparing 1997 (the year before the enactment of the first
takeover regulation following the U.K. approach) with 2006, the picture
that emerges shows that the ownership concentration is still very significant
(Figure 8). Additionally, there has been what might be called a “threshold
attraction” effect, meaning an increase in the number of corporations
controlled with a percentage between thirty and fifty percent of the voting
shares. 57 For reasons that we have previously analyzed, this effect can be
interpreted to suggest that, in light of the mandatory bid and the structure of
the passivity rule, holding more than thirty percent is sufficient to ensure a
stable control, for the reasons that we have previously analyzed. It may
also be true that there are an increased number of corporations with a more
widespread ownership structure where the majority shareholder holds less
than thirty percent, but nothing comparable to the U.K. situation.

57. Ventoruzzo, supra note 2, at 216.
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Figure 8 - Share ownership of controlling
shareholder(s) in Italy
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Also, looking at the qualitative evolution of the ownership structure
(Figure 9), it appears that the new rules have not significantly affected the
relative weight of large block-holders on the one hand, and institutional
investors and dispersed shareholders, on the other hand.

Figure 9 - Evolution of Ownership Structure of
Italian Corporations
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As with other data presented above, this data confirms that rules
similar to the British rules, when applied in a different context, do not
ensure the same results, but may instead have an opposite (and undesirable)
effect.

VII. CONCLUSION
The analysis in this article bears out both intuition and some
comments by Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, who postulated that
“similar regulatory changes may have very different effects within different
corporate governance systems. For example, while in some countries the
adoption of a specific takeover rule may lead toward more dispersed
ownership, in others this same rule may further reinforce the blockholderbased system.” 58
In sum, the three pillars of U.K. takeover regulation and of the XIII
Directive, the mandatory bid, the non-frustration rule, and breakthrough
rule, could act as wolves in sheep’s clothing when they cross the Channel.
This article raises new challenges for European legislators in terms of
crafting legislation. On the one hand, such legislation must provide for a
level of harmonization that will facilitate development of a single European
market. On the other hand, it cannot ignore the historical and economic
distinctions between jurisdictions that will affect how well the rules work
to promote their intended aim.
Legislatures and judiciaries are not perfect. Moreover, they are not—
and, to some extent, should not be—completely immune to the lawful
activities of lobbying groups. 59 What becomes unacceptable, however, is
when rules that protect incumbents are either erroneously or intentionally
presented as designed to benefit minority investors.
This conclusion does not imply a completely negative judgment on
either the U.K. approach as adapted to continental European jurisdictions,
or on the XIII Directive, notwithstanding the minimum harmonization that
it provides. As already mentioned, there are several advantages for
minorities deriving from both the mandatory bid rule and the passivity rule,
especially in case of a friendly acquisition that might exclude noncontrolling shareholders from benefiting from the market for corporate
control. In addition, the very fact that Europe has finally adopted a
common regulatory framework has historic and legal relevance that should
not be underestimated, even with its significant differences and potentially
diverging effects. 60 Now, more than ever, scholars, policy-makers and
58. Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog, supra note 10, at 29.
59. See Bebchuk & Neeman, supra note 7, for a model on this possible influence.
60. As pointed out by Gatti, supra note 24, at 560, notwithstanding the shortcomings of
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practitioners have adopted a common language and discuss very similar
problems concerning takeover regulation. A better awareness on the
crucial issues in this field is already emerging from this shared cultural
humus.

the limited harmonization, the approach followed by the directive might be considered a
sound second best, according to which Member States must “clearly state their positions on
the board neutrality rule and the BTR,” and “decide whether or not to enact the reciprocity
clause.”

